Few developers of commercial aviation software products are using object-oriented technology (OOT), despite its popularity in some other industries. Safety concerns about using OOT in critical applications, uncertainty about how to comply with regulatory requirements, and basic conservatism within the aviation community have been factors behind this caution.
Introduction
There is an increasing desire among aviation software developers to use object-oriented technology (OOT), including object oriented modeling, design, programming, and analysis, in the development of aviation applications. These desires are fueled, at least in part, by claims from OOT supporters, such as object orientation "is a more natural form of problem solution and that it results in heavier reuse than its traditional alternatives" [I] . Promises of improved reuse are especially appealing to vendors who build product families for a specialized market, such as aviation, over a long period of time.
Despite claimed cost and quality benefits, few civil aviation applications, especially in airborne systems, have been implemented using OOT.
Safety concerns coupled with uncertainty about how to comply with certification requirements have been key obstacles to widespread use of OOT in digital avionics systems.
Compliance with the objectives of RTCA/DO-178B, Sofhynre Considerations in Airbome Systems andEquipmenr Certifcarion [2] is the primary means of securing approval of software for use in civil transport aviation products. Similar objectives apply to software used in communications, navigation, and surveillance applications for air traffic management 131. Neither DO-178B nor DO-278, however, explicitly mentions OOT. Objectoriented (00) programs that have sought regulatory approval have been required to formulate issue papers to respond to certification concerns.
When DO-178B was published in 1992, structured programming was the predominant technique for organizing and coding computer programs in aviation applications. Although the guidance in DO-178B does not specify a particular development approach, the objectives were formulated largely from the perspective of structured programming. Both developers and certification authorities have raised questions about how the DO-178B objectives are to be satisfied in a project using OOT. Some of these issues are documented in position papers [4, 5] urlitten by the Certification Authorities Software Team (CAST), which helps harmonize software related policy and guidance among international certification authorities.
In an effort to resolve these issues, and to ensure that ell the important questions are both asked and answered, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) enlisted the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to help start the Object Oriented Technology in Aviation (OOTiA) project. This project is sponsoring research and conducting workshops designed to develop recommendations for safe use of OOT in compliance with DO-178B.
In 2001, a committee including representatives from the AVSI project, FAA, and NASA, was formed for the purpose of extending the AVSI work for the benefit of the entire aviation software community. This committee developed the following approach for accomplishing this purpose:
Set up a web site dedicated to collecting data on safety and certification concems Hold public workshops to which the aviation software community would be invited to discuss concems Document each key concern raised either through the web site or the workshops Adapt the AVSI guidelines to address all of the concems believed by the committee to be valid, -Produce a handbook. This paper does not attempt to describe fully all of the OOTiA project results to date. Instead, the paper gives only a brief overview of the project, and then discusses in detail the results from one particular session at the March 2003 workshop dedicated to scrutinizing the decision to use OOT. 
OOTiA Project Overview
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The draft handbook served as the basis for discussion at a second public workshop', held in March 2003. Most of the workshop was devoted to individual sessions on specific chapters of the handbook; however, at the request of NASA, a session titled, "Beyond the Handbook," was also held. Whereas the handbook provides guidelines for how to use OOT, assuming that the decision to use OOT has already been made, this session provided participants with an opportunity to discuss the questions that should be answered before the decision to use OOT is made. The remainder of this paper describes the results from this session.
Beyond the Handbook
At OOTiA Workshop 2, participants in the "Beyond the Handbook" session openly discussed ideas and produced a list of fifty-one questions related to making a decision about whether to use OOT. At the end of the brainstorming session, these questions were reviewed and then grouped under five high-level questions that should be answered before a decision is made. The rest of this section discusses each of these five questions, and the associated issues. claims. OOT is no exception. According to Glass [l] , two phenomena typically accompany such claims: "Once the concepts are more thoroughly understood, the benefits turn out to be far more modest than claimed," and "That transition from excessive claims to modest benefits has seldom been accomplished with the aid of evaluative research." That is, practitioners eventually recognize the modesty of the benefits on their own.
Reality of Benefits
Within a group of aviation software engineers, it is not surprising that questions were raised about evidence to support or deny claims. Participants in this session were particularly concerned about finding evidence to support extrapolating the advantages claimed for OOT (even if they are real) in non-safety critical systems to safety-critical systems. Because OOT bas been around for a relatively long time, one would think there would be an abundance of evidence to promote thorough understanding of OOT benefits. There is an abundance of material, but how much of it qualifies as evidence is debatable.
A quick search of the web for lessons learned and metrics for OOT will net literally thousands of references, from short experience reports to entire books devoted to lessons learned and metrics. A web search for information on empirical studies similarly will yield thousands of references. Studies can be found that support the claimed benefits, such as Basili's results showing reduced defect density and rework with OOT [7] , while other studies demonstrate potential problems such as complexity and maintenance problems with the unconstrained use of inheritance [8] . Few empirical studies, however, compare the effectiveness of different software engineering methods, such as comparing OOT to structured programming. development methods that might provide quantitative assessments are notoriously difficult and expensive. "It costs a lot of money and effort to do controlled experiments, and that is too high a price for most researchers equipped to do such studies, especially in the world of large-scale software" [9] . There are two studies, however, relevant to making the decision about OOT that are worth noting. In a 1994 study [ Various attributes of a project may help determine whether OOT is an appropriate choice. Some of these attributes are conventional metrics specific to the software product; for example, the size, criticality, and complexity of the software. Other product-specific attributes include the maturity of the software requirements, and the applicability of OOT to the specific problem domain. Concerns were discussed regarding the appropriateness of OOT for all problem domains.
Other attributes of interest relate to the longterm plans for the product. Important considerations here include whether the software is a new product or part of a product family. This would impact upgrade and maintenance requirements. These factors are important when weighing the potential benefits of reuse that OOT may offer.
OOT SpeeiJie Resourees answered is
Another question that should be asked and (3) What project resources, specific to OOT, are needed?
Once the project characteristics are known, it is important to evaluate resources specific for implementing OOT. Resources include those relevant to personnel who develop and approve the software product, and those relevant to managing processes and procedures for development and approval.
Personnel resources include OOT-specific training and experience, both at the individual level (such as the software developers and quality assurance personnel) and the corporate level. This includes training and experience with 00 methods for modeling, design, analysis and testing, and with 00 tools. Note that training and experience is a concern for regulators also, including Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) within the company and certifkation authorities responsible for the software approval on the project being reviewed.
Administrative resources include industry standards for OOT, such as those associated with the Object Management Group (OMG) standard for object-oriented modeling with the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [IS] and standards for 00 source code languages (for example, Ada95, Java, and CH). Other important standards include intemal process standards that define life cycle activities and data associated with OOT and how those map to activities and data specified in DO-178B. 00 tools are another important resource to consider. Some 00 tools inwoduce new levels of abstraction, such as the visual model level, that may not directly correspond to abstraction levels (highor low-level requirements or design) in DO-178B.
Factors to consider here include compatibility of new 00 tools with existing tools, notations, and processes; configuration management; and qualification costs.
The project characteristics together with the OOT specific resources within a company will influence the level of involvement, or degree of oversight, that the FAA has with a project. This is a non-trivial consideration with respect to both time and cost. The level of FAA involvement will dictate the number of software reviews, the stages of involvement, and the nature of the review [ 161. This level of regulatory involvement is closely related to the fourth of the high-level questions raised at the workshop. Are all of the objectives in DO-178B compatible with OOT? How should the handbook be applied to a practical project, and is the handbook adequate? As mentioned previously, the FAA is sponsoring the development of the OOTA handbook to provide information specific to meeting the DO-178B objectives when using OOT. Some participants in the brainstorming session argued that the existing guidance in DO-178B is sufficient to accommodate approval of an 00 program. Some questioned the wisdom of generating an OOT-specific handbook, and wondered whether that implied the need for additional method-specific handbooks. Other. participants, including some regulators, however, argued in favor of the benefits that additional clarification and guidelines might provide in the short term.
Regulatory Guidance
The handbook is not intended to be official FAA policy or guidance [17] , but the handbook will almost certainly influence the approval process for an 00 program. The handbook does not eliminate the need for compliance with DO-I78B, but instead provides guidelines for how to use OOT to comply with the DO-178B objectives. A significant portion of the handbook is devoted to patterns intended to ensure this compliance. developers and regulators, then it must provide clear guidelines. Clear communication of regulatory requirements, among regulators and between regulators and software developers, has been a perpetual problem for aviation software If the handbook is to be used effectively by development [ 181. Regulators and software developers must both understand the requirements the system must satisfy for it to be approved, and how the system will be shown to satisfy these requirements [ 191. Misunderstandings can result in substantial cost and schedule problems.
Technical Challenges
that should be asked and answered by anyone considering using OOT is Specific questions raised in the session concerned how well the essential elements of software engineering can be done using OOT to ensure the appropriate level of integrity. Most of the questions within this grouping were about requirements, verification, or safety.
Requirements
Several questions asked whether OOT is the correct approach for requirements development and implementation. In particular, questions were raised about the effectiveness and appropriateness of the 00 approach to requirements development, which is based on use cases. The discussion involved the difference between the functional decomposition (or structured programming) approach and object-orientation.
With functional decomposition, the typical programming unit is some form of subprogram, such as a function, subroutine, or procedure. Each subprogram typically performs a single specific function, where good programming practice calls for maximizing functional cohesion within a subprogram and minimizing coupling between subprograms. Applications are built by sequencing these functional building blocks-"fnst do this, then do that." Verification, in tum, starts with the functionality of an individual subprogram and works its way up by testing increasing levels of functionality.
focuses on objects and the operations performed by or to those objects. In an 00 program, a class, which is a set of objects that share a common In contrast to functional decomposition, OOT
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structure and a common behavior, is the structural element most comparable to a subprogram. Operations related to a given functional requirement often are distributed among objects associated with different classes.
The fundamental goal of the approval process, as guided by the Federal Aviation Regulations, is to provide assurance of the intended functionality and provide assurance that there is no unintended functionality. DO-178B does not refer specifically to subprograms or functional units, but it does organize guidance for development and verification around the decomposition of requirements from high-level requirements to low-level requirements to source code. This seems reasonable since the system level requirements, which are the source of the high-level software requirements, are written by and large from a functional perspective. Many of the development and verification objectives in Annex A of DO-178B are specific to high or low level requirements and code. . Typically, requirements for 00 systems are developed with use cases, scenarios, and various diagrams such as class, object, and activity diagrams. Determining how to map these modeling components, and their subsequent refinements, onto the DO-178B objectives was thought by session participants to be difficult. Some participants questioned whether such an approach is even appropriate for safety-critical applications. Requirements definition by any method is a significant challenge to developing a correct and safe system [20] . Developers should consider whether OOT makes this challenge more difficult.
Verification
In addition to the questions raised about the suitability of OOT for requirements development, a similar number of questions were raised about verification. The questions about verification are not unrelated to the concems raised about requirements. According to Alexander, "object oriented programs are generally more complex than their procedural counterparts. This added complexity results. from inheritance, polymorphism, and the complex data interactions tied to their use. Although these features provide power and flexibility, they increase complexity and require more testing" [ Other questions focused on more specific aspects of verification, especially analysis issues such as source to object code traceability, and control and data flow analysis. Several participants in the session argued for the application of static analysis and formal methods.
achowledged the need for additional research to better understand error classes that are unique to OOT, such as research by Offutt [22] , and to better understand the extent that existing methods are adequate for verifying OOT.
With respect to verification, many participants
Safety
The final technical challenge mentioned in the questions concems the ability to conduct system and software safety assessment. Participants discussed whether system and safety assessments can be easily and accurately derived from an 00 program. Current safety analysis is often based on determining that a function, as implemented, is both correct and safe. OOT complicates this analysis because the operations related to a function can be widely distributed throughout the objects, making the function difficult to trace.
Workshop participants are not alone in questioning safety analysis on 00 systems. In a related discussion on the safety-critical mailing list, participants discussed the importance of a functional perspective to safety analysis. In the mailing list discussion, Nancy Leveson argued that engineers find that functional decomposition is a more natural approach to the design of control systems, and "That naturalness translates into easier ' to understand and review, easier to design without errors, easier to analyze to determine whether the system does what the engineer want and does it safely" 1231. Others suggested design approaches in OOT to enhance the ability to do the safety analysis.
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Even though safety analysis is not part of the life cycle activities specified in DO-l78B, the effect of 00 design and implementation on safety analysis should be carefully considered.
weigh their program needs with the benefits and risks of OOT." This includes examining the evidence relevant to the benefits of OOT, project characteristics and resources, and the technical challenges.
As noted in [4] , "Developers should carefully
Summary
Object-oriented technology is immensely popular within certain segments of the software community, but popularity does not guarantee propriety, especially for safety-critical systems. An intelligent decision about whether to use OOT must be based on answering specific questions about OOT's propriety for particular applications and levels of integrity. This paper has presented some of the questions proposed by members of the aviation software community as important to ask before using OOT. Only if each of these questions is answered satisfactorily should an aviation software developer commit to using OOT. If this decision is made, then the OOTiA handbook, once it is completed, will provide guidelines to assist developers in obtaining approval from certification authorities for OOT software.
